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I. Introduction 
This article summarizes and discusses important developments in 
Wyoming’s oil and gas law between August 1, 2019 and July 31, 2020. 
During this time period, the Wyoming Legislature passed bills into law 
providing changes to the state’s statutory pooling structure, changing the 
regulatory body overseeing commercial disposal wells, and establishing the 
Wyoming Energy Authority. The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (“WOGCC”) promulgated new rules concerning the 
submission and protest of applications for permits to drill.  
Also, during this applicable time period, there were cases of note which 
dealt with arbitrary and capricious WOGCC action, testing the validity of 
WOGCC orders, civil trespass and the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies at the WOGCC, and the nature of valid offers under the Wyoming 
Eminent Domain Act. 
II. Legislation 
A. Changes to Statutory Pooling 
House Bill 0014, signed into law on March 9, 2020, with an effective 
date of July 1, 2020, amended Wyoming Statute 30-5-109 to make mineral 




The Wyoming statutory pooling law had previously assessed a uniform 
non-consent penalty against all types of non-consenting parties; the 
amended law now assesses different maximum non-consent penalties 
depending on the type of non-consenting party.
2
   
Non-consenting unleased mineral owners now are subject to a lower 
maximum penalty than that assessed against non-consenting mineral 
                                                                                                             
 1. H. B. 0014, 65th Budget Sess., (Wyo. 2020). 
 2. Id. 
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lessees:  for the first well drilled in a drilling unit, the maximum penalty is 
200% of drilling costs and 125% of well equipment cost, and for any 
subsequent well drilled in a drilling unit, the maximum penalty is 150% of 
drilling costs and 125% of well equipment cost.
3
 
The amended law also grants a statutory royalty to any unleased mineral 
owner who does not consent to participate in the drilling of a well and is 
subsequently statutorily pooled by a pooling order of the WOGCC, with 
such royalty to be paid during the time period the participating owners are 
collecting the recovery of costs and the applicable penalty as set forth in the 
WOGCC order.
4
 The statutory royalty is calculated as the greater of 16% 
and the acreage-weighted average of the royalty being paid on the leased 
tracts in the applicable drilling unit.
5
 
Additionally, after the participating owners have received proceeds from 
production that satisfy the established non-consent penalties, the operator of 
the well must offer any non-consenting unleased mineral owners the option 
either to continue receiving the non-consent royalty or to participate in the 
well as a working interest owner.
6
  
The amended law now provides an expiration date for pooling orders 
issued by the WOGCC; previously, a pooling order could be valid 
indefinitely unless an expiration date was included in the order itself. Now, 
a pooling order expires twelve months after issuance if the person 
authorized to drill and operate the force-pooled well fails to commence 
operations within twelve months of issuance of the pooling order.
7
  
These changes to Wyoming’s forced pooling law became effective on 
July 1, 2020 and are not retroactive.
8
 
B. Change to Regulation of Commercial Disposal Wells 
Senate File 0045, signed into law on March 10, 2020, with an effective 
date of July 1, 2020, amended Wyoming Statute 30-5-104 to give the 
WOGCC regulatory authority over both commercial and noncommercial 
underground disposal of salt water, nonpotable water, and oilfield wastes 
into Class II Injection Wells (as defined under the federal Safe Drinking 
Water Act).
9
 The WOGCC is to promulgate any rules necessary to 
                                                                                                             
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-109 (West 2020). 
 9. H. B. 0045, 65th Budget Sess., (Wyo. 2020). 
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Previously, the WOGCC only regulated noncommercial underground 
disposal of such products (noncommercial operation being when an oil and 
gas well operator injects oilfield wastes into Class II Injection Wells that 
such operator owns), and the Wyoming Department of Environmental 
Quality regulated commercial disposal (commercial operation being when 
an oil and gas well operator pays a third party to inject oilfield wastes into 
Class II Injection Wells owned by that third party).
11
 
C. Wyoming Energy Authority Established 
In the 2019 legislature, Senate File 0037, signed into law on February 
15, 2019 with an effective date of July 1, 2020, established a new state 
agency named the “Wyoming Energy Authority” by merging together the 
Wyoming Pipeline Authority and the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority.
12
 
Subsequently in the 2020 legislature, House Bill 0003, signed into law on 
March 10, 2020 with an effective date of July 1, 2020, made various 
revisions to the act creating the Wyoming Energy Authority.
13
 
Between the two pieces of legislation, the new Wyoming Energy 
Authority has a broad mandate which notably includes the authority to 
acquire, construct, hold, use, lease, and sell pipelines, transportation 
infrastructure, distribution facilities, and advanced technology facilities for 
natural resources associated with energy or carbon dioxide capture.
14
 




The Authority is governed by a seven voting member board appointed by 
the governor.
16
 Additionally there are five ex officio nonvoting members, of 




                                                                                                             
 10. Notice of Intent to Amend/Adopt Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission, WOGCC, August 10, 2020, https://docs.google.com/a/wyo.gov/ 
viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=d3lvLmdvdnxvaWwtYW5kLWdhc3xneDo0YzBlZWUwODJ
jMzczMGVm. (last visited Sept. 9, 2019). 
 11. H. B. 0045, Official Summary, 65th Budget Sess., (Wyo. 2020). 
 12. S. File 0037, 65th Gen. Sess., (Wyo. 2019). 
 13. H. B. 0003, 65th Budget Sess., (Wyo. 2020). 
 14. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-5-503. 
 15. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-5-505(a). 
 16. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-5-502(b). 
 17. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-5-502(c). 
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III. State Regulation 
A. New Rules for Submitting and Challenging Applications for Permit to 
Drill 
Historically Wyoming has had a pure “race to permit” regulatory regime 
regarding the filing of Applications for Permit to Drill (“APDs”). For any 
given drilling unit, the first party to file APDs (up to the allowable well 
density amount in that drilling unit) would receive the APDs and other 
later-to-file parties who filed APDs in that drilling unit would have their 
APDs denied. Additionally, the WOGCC rules did not provide for one 
operator to be named as operator of an entire drilling unit – operatorship 
was determined on a well-by-well basis. The “race to permit” approach was 
considered a fair method of competition among oil and gas operators. 
However, the increased interest in Wyoming in recent years as a viable 
place to drill and operate led to a record number of horizontal well APDs 
being filed, which overwhelmed the capacity of the WOGCC staff to 
process APDs and also led to a large increase in horizontal well APD 
protests between operators.  The increased regulatory activity was seen as a 
drag on the efficiency of the industry. As a result, the WOGCC amended its 




The WOGCC promulgated new Section 8(l), in Chapter 3 of the 
WOGCC Rules, which provides that for any given drilling unit for 
horizontal wells, there is an established priority as to who may submit an 
APD in that drilling unit. Only APDs from the operator of a spud or 
completed well in that drilling unit may submit APDs for that drilling 
unit.
19
 In the event there is no spud or completed well in that drilling unit, 
only the operator with the oldest pending or approved APD may submit 
further APDs in that drilling unit or have its existing APDs extended.
20
 By 
implication, in the event there are no spud or completed wells in a drilling 
unit and there are also no pending or approved APDs in that drilling unit, 
then the traditional race-to-permit rules apply. 
While new Chapter 3, Section 8(l), of the WOGCC Rules provides for a 
type of operatorship control over an entire drilling unit, the WOGCC also 
                                                                                                             
 18. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission Rules, Chap. 3, Secs. 8(l) and 
8(m). 
 19. Id., Sec. 8(l). 
 20. Id. 
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promulgated new Section 8(m) in Chapter 3 of the WOGCC Rules, which 
provides an avenue for challenging that operatorship.
21
 
Section 8(m) states that for any operator who cannot submit or extend an 
APD in a given drilling unit pursuant to 8(l), such operator may file APDs 
in certain limited time intervals.
22
 At certain times this 8(m) filing acts as a 
protest and counter-filing against a new APD filed by the current operator 
in control of the drilling unit, and at other times the 8(m) filing may be 




If the operator in control files a new APD, any other party owning an 
interest in that drilling unit may file notice of intent to file an “8(m) hearing 
application” within fifteen days after receiving the operator’s APD notice, 
and then file the complete 8(m) hearing application within thirty days after 
receiving the APD notice.
24
 
The non-control party may also file an 8(m) hearing application within 
15 days of the two-year anniversary of the most-recent spud date in the 
DSU in question.
25
 This provision allows a non-control party to challenge 
the operator in control of the DSU if two years have elapsed with no 
drilling activity in the DSU. 
The operator in control of the DSU will receive notice of the 8(m) 
hearing application and may decide to protest the application if it so 
desires.
26
 Notably, in a contested hearing before the WOGCC under 8(m), if 
the WOGCC deems equal the evidence presented by the parties, the 
WOGCC shall approve the application or the protest (as applicable) of the 
party who has secured the largest percentage of working interest ownership 
in the DSU, combining with it the working interest ownership of other 
working interest owners who have expressed written support to partner with 




                                                                                                             
 21. Id., Sec. 8(m). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id., Sec. 8(m)(iii). 
 27. Id., Sec. 8(m)(iv). 
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IV. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court of Wyoming 
1. Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action 
The issue in Exaro Energy III, LLC v. Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission and Jonah Energy, LLC arose from a WOGCC 
order that denied a drilling and spacing unit (“DSU”) application by Exaro 




Exaro had initially made two DSU applications in the Jonah Field, and 
the proposed DSUs were adjacent to each other.
29
 Jonah then protested the 
applications, claiming that the orientation of the proposed units was new for 
the Jonah Field and would cause waste if initial drilling was unsuccessful.
30
 
A consolidated contested hearing for the two proposed adjacent units 
was held at the WOGCC; Exaro and Jonah agreed that the evidence 
presented at the hearing would apply to both DSU applications.
31
 At the 
hearing, the WOGCC decided that Exaro had met its burden of proof as to 
both proposed units, but nevertheless, the WOGCC approved only one DSU 
application, stating as its reason for denying the second application 
“additional data from horizontal development in the Jonah Field should be 
analyzed prior to approving the Application.”
32
  
Exaro then filed a petition for review of administrative action with state 
district court.
33
 Exaro then requested that the district court certify the 
review to the Wyoming Supreme Court and the district court granted 
Exaro’s request, and the Supreme Court accepted the certified case.
34
 
The Supreme Court started its analysis by noting that the applicable 
standard of review was set by statute in the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedures Act, specifically in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c).
35
 The statute 
states in relevant part that a reviewing court shall set aside agency action if 
the court finds it was either unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
                                                                                                             
 28. Exaro Energy III, LLC v. Wyo. O&G Conservation Comm., 2020 WY 8, 455 P.3d 
1243 (Wyo. 2020). 
 29. Id. at ¶ 1, 455 P.3d at 1246. 
 30. Id. at ¶ 5, 455 P.3d at 1247. 
 31. Id. at ¶ 1, 455 P.3d at 1246. 
 32. Id. at ¶ 8, 455 P.3d at 1247–48. 
 33. Id. at ¶ 2, 455 P.3d at 1246. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at ¶ 9, 455 P.3d at 1248. 
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reviewed on the record of an agency hearing, or it was arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.
36
  
The Court noted that the arbitrary and capricious standard is more lenient 
than the substantial evidence standard, because it only requires that there be 
a rational basis for the agency’s decision.
37
 The Court then cited to 
precedent that an agency should treat like cases alike, and that if an agency 




Because the WOGCC decided both DSU applications on the same 
evidence, and also found that Exaro had met its burden of proof as to both 
DSU applications, yet however only approved one DSU application and 




The Court held that the WOGCC decision to deny Exaro’s DSU spacing 




2. “Testing the Validity” of WOGCC Rules  
The issues in Black Diamond Energy of Delaware, Inc. v. Wyoming Oil 
and Gas Conservation Commission arose from a WOGCC order that 
forfeited the blanket bonds posted by Black Diamond Energy of Delaware, 
Inc. (“BDED”) concerning its operations in Wyoming.
41
 Rather than seek 
administrative review of the WOGCC order under the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedures Act (“WAPA”) and Wyoming Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 12 (“WRAP 12”), BDED decided to challenge the bond 
forfeiture by filing suit in Johnson County District Court utilizing the right 
to contest WOGCC orders found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-113(a) of the 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Act (the “Conservation Act”).
42
  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-113(a) provides in relevant part: “Any person 
adversely affected by and dissatisfied with any rule, regulation, or order… 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at ¶ 11, 455 P.3d at 1249. 
 38. Id. at ¶ 23, 455 P.3d at 1251. 
 39. Id. at ¶ 24, 455 P.3d at 1252. 
 40. Id. at ¶ 28, 455 P.3d at 1253. 
 41. Black Diamond Energy of Del., Inc. v. Wyo. O&G Conservation Comm., 2020 WY 
45, 460 P.3d 740 (Wyo. 2020). 
 42. Id. at ¶ 1, 460 P.3d at 743. 
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may within ninety (90) days after the entry thereof bring a civil suit… to 
test the validity of any provision of this act, or rule, regulation, or order.”
43
 
BDED filed suit under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-113(a) eighty-seven days 
after the entry of the WOGCC order.
44
 
At the district court, the WOGCC argued that WAPA and WRAP 12 
repealed the challenge right contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-113(a), 
and therefore BDED had filed its appeal too late, as the applicable appeal 
right under WAPA only gives thirty days to file an appeal.
45
 The district 
court agreed with the WOGCC and dismissed BDED’s case on those 
grounds.
46




The Supreme Court rejected the WOGCC’s argument that WAPA 
expressly repealed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-113(a).
48
 Further, the Court 
found that WAPA and WRAP 12 are not “so repugnant” to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 30-5-113(a) that they cannot logically stand together, and therefore there 




After finding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-113(a) was not repealed, the 
Court examined whether BDED’s complaint was proper under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 30-5-113(a).
50
 The Court examined what the language “to test the 
validity” meant, and found that it means to test the legal sufficiency, which 
is akin to an action for declaratory judgment.
51
 The Court then found that an 
action under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-113(a) could test the legal sufficiency 




Since BDED was asking for a review of the merits of the WOGCC’s 
decision to forfeit BDED’s bonds, an action under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-
113(a) was not available for such review, and therefore BDED’s filing for 
review was too late under the applicable WAPA appeal procedure.
53
 The 
                                                                                                             
 43. Id. at ¶ 11, 460 P.3d at 744–45. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 7, 460 P.3d at 744. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at ¶ 9, 460 P.3d at 744. 
 48. Id. at ¶¶ 14-19, 460 P.3d at 745–47. 
 49. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32, 460 P.3d at 749–50. 
 50. Id. at ¶ 33, 460 P.3d at 750. 
 51. Id. at ¶ 40, 460 P.3d at 752. 
 52. Id. at ¶¶ 41-43, 460 P.3d at 752–53. 
 53. Id. at ¶ 42, 460 P.3d at 752. 
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Court therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissals, but for different 
reasons than provided by the district court.
54
 
3. Civil Trespass and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The issue in Devon Energy Production Company v. Grayson Mill 
Operating, LLC arose from a civil trespass lawsuit that Devon Energy 
Production Company (“Devon”) filed against Grayson Mill Operating, LLC 
(“Grayson Mill”) while, at the same time, the parties had competing APDs 
filed at the WOGCC.
55
  
Devon and Grayson Mill had filed competing APDs in a group of DSUs, 
such that Devon then filed a lawsuit in state district court under a civil 
trespass statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-27-101, claiming that Grayson Mill 
had trespassed on lands of the applicable DSUs when Grayson Mill was 
obtaining information to file its competing APDs.
56
 Shortly thereafter, 
Devon filed applications with the WOGCC to deny or revoke Grayson 
Mill’s APDs.
57
  Devon also petitioned the WOGCC for the related 
administrative proceedings to be stayed while the civil trespass case 
proceeded, and the stay was granted by the WOGCC.
58
 
Pursuant to this particular civil trespass statute, if a party is found to have 
trespassed, certain data that the party obtained shall be expunged from 
filings with governmental agencies.
59
  Devon claimed that Grayson Mill 
had trespassed, and requested that the court order the data obtained by 




Grayson Mill claimed that “Devon failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies through the Commission... it [Grayson Mill] claimed the doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction required the district court to dismiss the complaint 
because the Commission was the proper forum for Devon’s claims. 
Grayson also argued Devon failed to exhaust its administrative remedies 
under the Commission’s rules.”
61
 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. at ¶ 1, 460 P.3d at 743.  
 55. Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. Grayson Mill Operating, LLC, 2020 WY 28, 458 P.3d 
1201 (Wyo. 2020). 
 56. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6, 458 P.3d at 1204. 
 57. Id. at ¶ 3, 458 P.3d at 1204. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at ¶ 21, 458 P.3d at 1208. 
 60. Id. at ¶ 4, 458 P.3d at 1204. 
 61. Id. at ¶ 7, 458 P.3d at 1204. 
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The district court found that Devon had failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies at the WOGCC and also that the WOGCC had 
primary jurisdiction over the issues at hand, and summarily dismissed the 
civil trespass case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
62
 
Devon appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court. After Devon’s appeal, 
the WOGCC dismissed Devon’s applications to deny or revoke the Grayson 
Mill APDs on the grounds that the WOGCC did not have jurisdiction to 
decide civil trespass under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-27-101.
63
 
The Court first examined the language of the civil trespass statute, and 
noted that the statute did not expressly exclude oil and gas matters.
64
 
Therefore the civil trespass statute’s “lessee of the land,” which is a party 




The Court reviewed applicable parts of the Conservation Act to analyze 
whether or not the WOGCC had jurisdiction to determine civil trespass 
issues, which would impact the Court’s decision as to whether Devon was 
required to exhaust its administrative remedies at the WOGCC before 
proceeding with a civil case in state court.
66
 The Court noted precedent 
which stated the ‘“purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to avoid premature 
interruption of the administrative process where the agency has been 
created to apply a statute in the first place.’”
67
 The Court then stated “[T]he 
Court agrees with Devon that [‘w]hile the Commission does have authority 
to determine the validity of the APDs, the predicate question is whether 
there was a civil trespass.[’] The Commission does not have jurisdiction to 
consider a civil trespass and, therefore, there was nothing for Devon to 
exhaust at the administrative level.”
68
 
The Court also noted that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, where an 
administrative agency and a court both have subject matter jurisdiction over 
a matter but the court defers to the agency’s expertise, also did not apply 




                                                                                                             
 62. Id. at ¶ 8, 458 P.3d at 1204–05. 
 63. Id. at ¶ 9, 458 P.3d at 1205. 
 64. Id. at ¶ 22, 458 P.3d at 1208. 
 65. Id. at ¶¶ 24-28, 458 P.3d at 1208–10. 
 66. Id. at ¶ 26, 458 P.3d at 1209. 
 67. Id. at ¶ 31, 458 P.3d at 1210 (citation omitted). 
 68. Id. at ¶ 33, 458 P.3d at 1211. 
 69. Id. at ¶ 38, 458 P.3d at 1212. 
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Since the Court found state district court to be the body with jurisdiction 
over civil trespass claims, and that Devon had standing as a “lessee of the 
land” to bring a civil trespass claim under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-27-101, the 
Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case and remanded the 
case back to district court for further proceedings.
70
 
4. Good Faith Offer for Wyoming Eminent Domain Act 
The issue in EOG Resources, Inc. v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc. arose 
from a proposed Surface Use Agreement that would grant additional rights 
over the property.
71
 EOG Resources, Inc. (“EOG”) filed a condemnation 
action against Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc. (“Reno”) seeking to condemn 
roughly 2,100 acres of Reno’s ranch.
72
  
EOG conducted oil and gas operations on Reno’s ranch pursuant to a 
2010 surface use agreement.
73
 EOG proposed an amended surface use 
agreement that would grant it additional surface use rights, access rights-of-
way, and easements.
74
 Reno rejected the offer and proposed a counteroffer 
that sought higher compensation for the project.
75
 Reno also noted that 
EOG was already authorized under the existing agreement to “undertake 
most of [the] proposed development”.
76
 EOG responded with a “Final Offer 
Letter” claiming that the Reno’s counteroffer proposed compensation far 
greater than the value of the agreement.
77
 EOG then filed a complaint under 
the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, seeking to condemn rights-of-way, 




The district court had an expedited hearing on the complaint.
79
 During 
the hearing, Reno’s president testified that EOG had rights under the 
existing agreement to complete most of the proposed projects on Reno’s 
ranch.  Nearly four months later, EOG amended its complaint, now only 
seeking to condemn a 70-acre pipeline easement.
80
 EOG argued that they 
stripped all of the existing rights out of the condemnation suit, and were 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. at ¶ 40, 458 P.3d at 1213. 
 71. EOG Res., Inc. v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 2020 WY 95, ¶ 1 (Wyo. 2020). 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.at ¶ 3.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at ¶ 7.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at ¶ 8.  
 79. Id. at ¶ 9.  
 80. Id. at ¶ 13.  
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now seeking the rights to complete the pipeline.
81
 The district court 
dismissed EOG’s complaint, concluding that they had not complied with 
the Eminent Domain Act's good-faith negotiation requirement because the 





On appeal, EOG argued that it had complied with the Wyoming Eminent 
Domain Act because the seventy acres it sought to condemn were included 
within its offers to Reno and depicted on the maps it provided Reno.
84
 EOG 
also argued that the district court’s holding would require an exact match 
between a purchase offer and property rights to be condemned.
85
 The Court 
disagreed.
86
 Instead, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the good-faith 
negotiation requirement of the Eminent Domain Act requires a “sufficient 
resemblance” between the property sought in the offer and the property 
sought in the condemnation action such that “the subject of the negotiation 
was clear to both parties”.
87
 Further, “there must be sufficient 
resemblance . . . to allow a court to conclude that the offer might have been 
accepted as it related to the property ultimately sought to be condemned.”
88
 
In this case, the property EOG ultimately sought to condemn was “a 
needle in the haystack of the original offer.”
89
 It was not clear that the 70 
acres were the subject of the negotiations.
90
 The Court ruled that it is not 
reasonable to expect Reno to see that EOG’s offer contained a discrete sub-
offer for the 70-acre pipeline easement from the map, financial summary 
chart, and proposed agreements covering 2,100 acres and containing a 










                                                                                                             
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at ¶ 15.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at ¶ 14.  
 85. Id. at ¶ 25.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at ¶ 25.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at ¶ 24. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at ¶27. 
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